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Why wait? Organizational learning, institutional quality and the speed of 
foreign market re-entry after initial entry and exit 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using a unique dataset of over 1,000 foreign market re-entries by multinational enterprises, we draw 
on organizational learning and institutional theory perspectives to examine the antecedents of speed of 
foreign market re-entry into previously exited markets. Contrary to expectations, we find that the length 
of experience accumulated between initial entry and exit does not lead to earlier re-entries. In turn, the 
depth of experience accumulated through operating via joint ventures and the nature of the experience 
determined by the exit process have a significant impact for early re-entrants. Host country institutional 
quality leads to early re-entry and, under certain circumstances, moderates the relationship between 
learning from past experiences and re-entry speed. Our findings reveal experience-based learning to 
be a complex and dynamic process, one highly dependent on the quality of the institutional setting of 
the firm. Theoretical and practical implications of the paper are discussed, along with directions for 
future research on international business strategies.  
Keywords: foreign market re-entry speed; exit; time-out; learning; experience; institutional theory 
 
1. Introduction 
Notwithstanding the pervasiveness of foreign market re-entry, when and how multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) return to already exited markets is not yet fully understood (Surdu, Mellahi and Glaister, 2015; 
2018b; Vissak and Francioni, 2013; Vissak and Zhang, 2015; Welch and Welch, 2009). Guided by 
market entry research, we draw on learning and institutional theories to examine how prior experience 
and the institutional context influence an MNE's speed of foreign market re-entry into an already exited 
market. Our knowledge of the antecedents of speed of re-entry into a foreign market is informed 
primarily by research into initial market entry decisions (Chetty, Johanson and Martín-Martín, 2014; 
García-García, García-Canal and Guillén, 2017; Gaur, Kumar and Singh, 2014; Jiang, Beamish and 
Makino, 2014; Tan and Mathews, 2015). Grounded in learning theory, the crux of this burgeoning 
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literature is that learning - the development of new knowledge or understanding as a result of past 
experiences which have the potential to impact on the future behaviour of the organisation (Hurley and 
Hult, 1998, p. 43) - is an important determinant of the MNE’s speed of entry into foreign markets 
(Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Surdu, Mellahi and Glaister, 2018b). What is more, different 
types of experiences are expected to impact international business strategies such as speed of entry 
depending on whether they accentuate or reduce uncertainties associated with going into a new 
international market (see also Delios and Henisz, 2003; Gao and Pan, 2010; Hilmersson and Jansson, 
2012). Learning enables the MNE to absorb and utilise knowledge acquired through different types of 
past experiences to better assess the risks and benefits associated with market entry strategies.  
 A second strand of literature draws on institutional theory to improve our understanding of 
market entry strategies (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009; Surdu et al., 2018b). The central tenet 
of this line of research is that the external, institutional environment takes a "rulelike status" regulating 
the behaviour of firms and ensuring that they can engage in market transactions without incurring undue 
costs. These institutions include, for instance, the legal framework, intellectual property rights, 
protection of investment and their enforcement, and regulatory regimes (North, 1990; see also 
Levchenko, 2007). We adopt a broad differentiation of institutions into higher or weaker institutional 
quality environments. We consider environments to be of "high institutional quality" if they reduce the 
ambiguity associated with the rules which managers should follow when entering a host market. Higher 
institutional quality - by reducing confusion around what drives firms to successfully comply with host 
market institutional requirements - drives earlier entry into that market (Gaba, Pan and Ungson, 2002; 
Hilmersson and Jansson, 2012; Hsu, Chen and D'Arcy, 2017). Conversely, entering environments with 
"weak institutional quality" translates into greater perceived institutional ambiguity regarding changing 
trends in core dimensions of the institutional environment which may generate important hazards for 
the MNE's international expansion strategies, potentially leaving managers unclear about when to enter. 
 In this study, we extend previous research on the speed of foreign market entry by focusing on 
re-entry. We contend that the pervasive assumptions on the impact of past experience and institutional 
quality/ambiguity and speed of entry need to be revised in the context of re-entry because the latter has 
some unique features that differentiate it from initial entry. As noted earlier, speed of entry is explained 
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by learning which refers to the process of “encoding inferences” from past experiences into practices 
that guide the behavior of the firm (Levitt and March, 1988, p. 320). Yet, we argue that inferences from 
past experiences obtained in the same market considered for re-entry are different from those made 
from experiences gained in a different market as is the case in conventional market entry research 
(Welch and Welch, 2009).  Further, the motive for exit and whether the MNE was pushed or voluntarily 
exited the market will shape how past experience is interpreted which subsequently influences re-entry 
(Surdu et al., 2018b). Experience accumulated through successes may be different and less impactful 
on learning from that accumulated through mistakes or failures (Surdu et al., 2018b; Xia, Boal and 
Delios, 2009; Zeng, Shenkar, Lee and Song, 2013). This is more relevant for re-entrants which have 
been once unsuccessful and decided to exit, or for re-entrants which have been pushed from a market.  
 Experiences do not take place in a context-free-vacuum. Hence, the interpretation and 
usefulness of past experiences by MNEs are shaped by the quality of the institutional context within 
which they operate (Luo and Peng, 1999; Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011; Hilmersson and Jansson, 
2012). MNEs not only find it hard to evoke knowledge gained in weaker quality institutional 
environments where the rules of the game are ambiguous and laws are applied inconsistently, but they 
also find it difficult to interpret knowledge gained from such ambiguous environments (Luo and Peng, 
1999). In contrast to high quality institutional environments, where the rules of the game are clear and 
creation, codification and retention of knowledge is relatively structured, in institutionally 
weak/ambiguous environments (March, 2010), managers revert to informal practices - often implicit 
and unobservable - and may turn to personal networks to circumvent institutional voids (Mellahi, 
Frynas, Sun and Siegel, 2016) making it challenging for MNEs to learn from such experiences. We 
extend the broader market entry literature by examining the ambiguity reduction effects of institutional 
quality on the relationship between an MNE's past experience and speed of re-entry. We advocate that 
host institutional ambiguity is likely to account for the variance observed in the choice of international 
entry strategies such as when to re-enter an exited market. 
 Guided by research on the role of experience-based learning on MNE expansion (Luo and Peng, 
1999), we further differentiate experience according to length of experience, depth of experience and 
nature of experience. We argue that experience may not always speed up re-entry. Specifically, we 
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argue that length of experience, i.e., how long the MNE operated in the country, depth of experience, 
i.e. the degree to which the MNE engaged with local stakeholders/actors, and nature of experience, i.e., 
whether the MNE was forced to exit, have a differentiated impact on the lessons learned by firms which 
have exited and decided to re-enter. Hence, different types of experiences may influence the speed of 
re-entry in different ways. Such a fine-grained characterization of experience allows us to answer many 
previously unanswered questions about how the different types of experiences impact the MNE’s speed 
of international expansion. Do certain types of experiences speed up (re)-entry? Which ones reduce 
uncertainty and speed up (re)-entry and which ones accentuate it and delay (re)-entry? In addition, how 
do these experiences interact with the institutional environment to influence speed of (re)-entry?  
 Taken together, this study makes four contributions. First, it responds to recent calls for 
expanding the market entry research agenda by looking beyond the current dominant focus on initial 
foreign market entry, and for redirecting current research efforts towards a more phenomenon-driven 
perspective (Buckley, Doh and Benischke, 2017; Shaver, 2013; Surdu and Mellahi, 2016; Surdu et al., 
2018a). Second, we re-examine prevalent assumptions on the impact of experience-based organisational 
learning and institutional quality on the speed of foreign market (re)-entry. Third, while previous 
research has examined the direct impact of past experience and institutional quality, this study also 
examines their interactive effect on speed of re-entry. We contextualise learning by capturing whether 
and how stronger institutional quality reduces ambiguity associated with a target market and increases 
the effectiveness of learning from experiences acquired in that market. Fourth, by unpacking experience 
into multiple types, we provide a finely grained analysis of the impact of the MNE's past experiences 
on organizational learning and subsequently on speed of foreign market re-entry.  
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2. Theory and hypotheses 
2.1. Length of host market experience and re-entry speed 
Acquiring market specific experience is a time-consuming process that narrows the gap between the 
actual knowledge a firm possesses and the knowledge it needs to reduce the uncertainty associated with 
the liability of foreignness (Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Hilmersson and Jansson, 2012; Zhou 
and Guillén, 2015). Experience acquired over time becomes embedded in organizational routines and 
behaviors and thus, firms may find it easier to translate knowledge attained through past experience 
into learning (Sapienza, Autio, George and Zahra, 2006; Tan, Hung and Liu, 2007).  
 We contend that, having operated in the host market for a long period of time prior to exit, 
could lead to earlier re-entries. Our argument here is twofold. First, we argue that prior experiences 
accumulated over time can translate into increased confidence (March, 1991) in the ability of the firm 
to operate in the previously exited market. Spending a lengthier period of time in the market gives 
managers confidence that the firm has accumulated knowledge specific to that market, which increases 
the ability of the firm to evaluate its external environment (Zhou and Guillén, 2015). Previous studies 
focusing specifically on the relationships between experience, learning and organizational routines, 
have confirmed that MNEs which have been international for longer periods of time perceive 
themselves as being superior at integrating information into their routines and, therefore, more likely to 
learn (Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014; see also Zhou and Guillén, 2015). For re-entrants, the 
routines established during the initial entry into the market may be perceived as relevant to that market 
when the firm decides to re-enter. More experienced re-entrants may not require significant increase in 
learning opportunities during the time-out period between exit and re-entry, for which reason they may 
reduce the length of the time-out period by re-entering earlier.  
 Our second and inter-related argument is that firms may fear that knowledge accumulated from 
prior experience becomes wasted if they do not re-enter relatively early. The longer firms stay out of 
the market, the more likely it is that such valuable prior knowledge and experience, such as knowledge 
attained from network relationships, understanding of consumer preferences, and generally, host market 
specific experience, will have dissipated (de Holan, Philips and Lawrence, 2004; Cegarra-Navarro and 
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Moya, 2005; Tsang and Zahra, 2008). This is problematic because acquiring knowledge through 
experience is a costly process and that knowledge may be valuable and difficult to obtain by others such 
as competitors. Spending a long period of time in a market prior to exiting is also a sign of both firm 
and personal commitment to that market (Eriksson and Chetty, 2003). We propose that re-entrants 
which have accumulated substantial length of experience during their initial entry, may be keen to re-
enter the market earlier to leverage that experience. Our first hypothesis is as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The length of host market experience is positively related to speed of re-entry. 
 
2.2. Depth of host market experience and speed of re-entry  
Depth of host market experience refers to the extent to which the firm acquired highly sophisticated 
knowledge about a market (Eriksson and Chetty, 2003; García-García et al., 2017). It is well established 
that depth of experience increases with the resource commitment that firms undertake in a market 
through the mode of establishment (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Eriksson and Chetty, 2003; García-
García et al., 2017). Thus, firms which commit significant resources to host markets through equity 
investment modes such as wholly owned subsidiaries, are expected to accumulate sophisticated 
knowledge through broad and rich experiences (Casillas and Moreno-Mendez, 2014; Isobe, Makino 
and Montgomery, 2000). However, in contrast to length of experience, we advocate that depth of 
experience accentuates uncertainty and results in delayed re-entries. This is because when managers 
make a strategic decision such as when to re-enter, they rely not only on the depth of information they 
possess, but on how the value of their efforts is perceived and rewarded by their organization (Quinn 
and Cameron, 1988; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Managers interpret their responsibilities within an MNE 
as a 'psychological contract' with the firm for which they deploy considerable time, effort and other 
resources (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Quinn and Cameron, 1988). Because depth of experience generally 
requires significant effort involved in setting up and managing operations in the host market, once the 
strategies that firms implement are not appropriately recognised or fail, as may be the case with market 
exit, managers may become discouraged and less proactive in pursuing new strategies immediately after 
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exit as they do not wish to be associated with failure (Leonard-Barton, 1992). In such cases, managers 
may prefer to move on and forget the experience which may, in turn, reduce the benefits of learning 
from the experience leading to knowledge loss and unlearning (Mariano, Casey, and Olivera, 2018; 
Levitt and March, 1988). For instance, it would have become apparent to re-entrants how difficult it is 
to set up a subsidiary, whilst at the same time re-entering via a lower commitment mode would be 
perceived negatively. Contrastingly, low commitment investments, such as non-equity partnerships, are 
considered temporary by firms and require relatively less efforts from managers and therefore they 
would not be put off by the limited appreciation of their experience by the MNE.  
 Hence, the links between efforts invested in setting up a foreign subsidiary and the exit 
outcome, for both the MNE and managers involved, make depth of experience more of a deterrent to 
re-entry. Organizational forgetfulness often takes time (Mariano et al., 2018). It may, therefore, take 
time for re-entrants to forget the exit experience and the efforts put into the establishment and 
management of the subsidiary before they consider re-entry. Further, the costs of acquiring deeper 
knowledge may be irreversible in the short term due to difficulties in selling off the acquired assets or 
re-deploying them to other markets or activities (Belderbos and Zou, 2009; Isobe et al., 2000). Overall, 
the high cost of exit, associated with high commitment modes, can increase the perceived uncertainty 
of operating in the market, making managers extra vigilant and encouraging them to take measured 
steps before re-entering. Thus, we propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The depth of host market experience is negatively related to speed of re-entry. 
 
 
2.3. Nature of host market experience and speed of re-entry 
How firms codify their experiences and utilise them in decision making depends not only on the 
‘frequency’ of past experiences (i.e. length of experience in a foreign market), but also on how closely 
‘related’ experiences are to the new decision being made, which we refer to in this study as the nature 
of past experience (Levitt and March, 1988, p. 328). The nature of past experience refers to whether 
firms have previously abandoned the market due to poor performance for which management are to 
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blame or due to changing external circumstances. The inherent relatedness of the decision to exit to the 
re-entry decision makes the nature of a re-entrant's experience, reflected in the exit motives, more 
readily pertinent to managers deciding whether or not to delay re-entry. Understanding the nature of the 
experience accumulated in a market is important for managers choosing to re-enter a market, because 
experiences accumulated when exiting that market - which often result in enduring memories and 
reluctance to re-experiment - are likely to be more present in organisational memory (Gong, Zhang and 
Xia, 2017) and weigh more heavily than experiences obtained from operating in the host market over a 
longer period of time (Padmanabhan and Rao, 1999). In instances where losses because of exit "hurt" 
more than the potential “feel good” of successful re-entry (Liesch, Welch and Buckley, 2011; March, 
2010), managers may become risk-averse (Gong et al., 2017; Liesch et al., 2011) and delay re-entry.  
 Exit due to poor performance in the host market may indicate to the management that the firm 
did not have the appropriate strategy or sufficient capabilities to operate effectively in the host market 
compared to its competitors (Benito and Welch, 1997; Benito, 2005; Mellahi, 2003). Given the nature 
of this past experience, the MNE would be expected to require a time-out period to re-assess previous 
decisions and acquire new capabilities in order to develop a new market strategy. Danone’s multiple 
exits from China's dairy and confectionary markets were followed by a rebranding and customisation 
of the product offering, and more appropriate selection of local partners, which resulted in earlier re-
entries for the company. Relatedly MNEs may re-enter early to sustain the momentum gained prior to 
the negative exit experience and ensure that planned changes in re-entry strategy remain relevant to the 
host market conditions. When the exit is associated with managerial capabilities and decision-making 
processes, managers may also be subject to more scrutiny from investors and thus incentivized to 
unpack the causes for their failed operations and address them. Because managers do not wish to be 
associated with failure and blamed for market exit, they would seek to re-enter earlier. We propose that 
firms which have had negative experiences and have underperformed in the market, rather than 
admitting to a failed course of action, opt for reinforcing their market commitment through early re-
entry, in order to increase their gains, prove that the initial decision to enter was not a mistake and to 
illustrate that the firm was not weakened by this decision.  
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 In turn, companies may be pushed out of the market irrespective of their performance because 
of changing circumstances in their external environment that are beyond their control, such as 
regulations against foreign investment in some sectors, or local stakeholders’ hostility, such as boycott 
towards certain industries or firms (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev and Peng, 2013). The nature of such 
experiences is likely to lead to delayed re-entries. When the Chinese console market regulated electronic 
games content in 2000, Nintendo and Sony (Japan) felt unwelcome to sell their consoles in China, exited 
and re-entered 14 years later. Involuntary exit experiences can represent a source of re-entry deterrence 
in the short term as managers become more focused on protecting what they have gained whilst 
operating in the market the first time around, rather than risking early re-entry. This experience is not 
expected to trigger a re-assessment of managerial judgement. Hence, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 3: The nature of experience influences speed of re-entry such that, exit due to poor 
performance is positively related to speed of re-entry compared to involuntary market exit. 
 
2.4. Host institutional quality and speed of re-entry 
 
The choice of when to re-enter may depend on how managers perceive the host institutional 
environment related to aspects such as resource acquisition, setting up operations in the market, 
accessing market intermediaries, and (re)attaining market legitimacy (Surdu et al., 2018b). The 
challenge, however, is when the institutional environment is ambiguous (Townsend and Hart, 2008) 
and characterised by conflicting and poorly enforced rules and regulations that may, in addition, be 
constantly changing as the institutionalisation processes unfolding during the time-out period are not 
necessarily predictable (Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008). The ambiguity inherent in an economy with 
poor quality institutions can only be reduced over time (Tan et al., 2007). When the institutions and 
policies of host countries are not consistent with the cornerstone of institutional quality, namely 
economic freedom (Gwartney and Lawson, 2003; Khanna, Palepu and Sinha, 2005), reluctance 
associated with investing in a market may occur. This is because economic freedom - "the degree to 
which a market economy is in place, where the central components are voluntary exchange, free 
competition and protection of persons and property" (Berggren, 2003, p. 193) - determines whether 
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institutions function correctly and consistently, and whether they contribute to increased market 
efficiencies or whether they hamper the procurement of firm resources (Tan et al., 2007). In 
environments with weak institutional quality, the lack of transparency associated with not having 
accurate information about "accepted practices related to capital markets, including the legal and 
judicial system, the government’s macroeconomic and fiscal policies, accounting norms and practices 
(including corporate governance and the release of information), ethics, corruption, and regulations, 
customs and habits compatible with the norms of society" (Millar, Eldomiaty, Choi and Hilton, 2005, 
p. 163) will lead managers to perceive the host environment as ambiguous. When institutional quality 
is weak, re-entering too early can increase the possibility of MNEs choosing inopportune strategies, as 
not sufficient time has been allocated to learning about the market.  
 Whilst slowly shifting towards market based economies, countries with weak 
quality/ambiguous institutions remain heavily regulated with low macroeconomic stability and reduced 
economic freedom. This may influence the time it takes to (re-)enter as local institutional actors may 
set restrictions on the amount of ownership a firm can take in a market (Hsu et al., 2017; Putzhammer, 
Fainshmidt, Puck and Slangen, 2018; Tan et al., 2007). Hostility to foreign firms characterized the 
French automotive industry in the 1960s and 1970s. In response to government imposed tariff levels up 
to 220%, Ford Motor (U.S.) established production facilities in France, which they closed down in the 
mid-1960s due to over-involvement of government in the company's operations. Chrysler and General 
Motors' (U.S.) attempts to integrate their French and European operations were also obstructed by 
successive changes in legislation and by government instability, which encouraged national autonomy 
and supported unproductive national players at the expense of market efficiency. Foreign automakers 
waited 15 years to renegotiate their re-entries into France. Because re-entry uncertainty is already high, 
MNEs may trade-off early re-entries to ensure that they manage with the institutional ambiguity caused 
by incorrect and inconsistent application of laws and legislations in the host market.  
 Operating effectively in markets characterized by weak institutional quality requires the MNE 
to possess market and non-market capabilities to deal with institutional ambiguities and avoid 
miscalculating investment opportunities (Delios and Henisz, 2003; Liou, Chao and Yang, 2016; Meyer 
et al., 2009). Hence, more time and resources need to be spent to acquire this information and bypass 
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institutional voids. Having exited South Africa due to pressures from the apartheid regime, Standard 
Chartered (U.S.) decided that "the time was right" to re-enter after a decade during which the company 
built its business elsewhere in Africa. Bypassing institutional ambiguity through obtaining institutional 
credibility from key actors in weaker quality host institutional contexts requires time to harvest (Miller, 
1992). This is particularly the case after exiting a market and disrupting relationships with institutional 
actors that can provide political clout and increase bargaining power with governments.  
 With a greater level of institutional quality, ambiguity is reduced. Hence, the time and effort 
needed to acquire information about the market also becomes reduced. Foreign firms require fewer 
permits, formalities and licenses to operate in such markets (Doh, Rodrigues, Saka-Helmhout and 
Makhija, 2017). The higher the quality of institutions, the more re-entrant firms may wish to take 
advantage of current opportunities and not wait long to re-enter, since those markets may also appear 
attractive to other potential entrants and or re-entrants. Thus, we propose the following:  
 
Hypothesis 4: A higher level of host institutional quality is positively related to speed of re-entry. 
 
2.5. Joint effects of type of experience and host institutional quality  
Meyer et al. (2009) and later Gaur et al. (2014) highlighted that institutions play a moderating role in 
the (intangible) resource considerations for entry strategies. Similarly, we propose that host institutional 
quality affects not only the manner in which new resources can be acquired but also how previous 
resources can be utilised. This is because the value of possessing prior experience accumulated in the 
past can be expected to increase with improvements in the quality of host institutions (see also 
Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 2008). This is realized through several mechanisms.  
 Intangible resources such as knowledge and experience accumulated over time are, indeed, 
valuable, but only if those resources can be appropriately encoded, interpreted, converted into 
organizational learning and subsequently fed into organizational memory and routines (Grant, 1996; 
Schulz, 2001). However, not all knowledge can be codified (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Saviotti, 
1998) particularly if acquired in weak quality/ambiguous institutional environments. Ambiguity 
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encapsulates the degree to which information and knowledge acquired through direct experiences can 
be absorbed and transferred (Simonin, 1999) to subsequently be exploited via early re-entry. The 
ambiguity inherent in unstable and weaker quality host institutional environments makes it difficult to 
codify, interpret, and learn from, experiences accumulated over time (Sun, Mellahi and Wright, 2009). 
Firms operating in such institutional contexts may rely significantly on informal institutions and 
personal relationships of management with local market stakeholders (Li, Zhou and Shao, 2009). This, 
in turn, means that the knowledge acquired through experiences is tacit and deeply rooted in the 
managers' involvement in a specific institutional context (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Often firms 
may have to rely on the know-how, technologies, resources and expertise of local stakeholders which 
further increases the complexity of a particular knowledge source (Simonin, 1999). This knowledge 
acquired through experience may not be documented within the firm through a formal, systematic 
language and may therefore be lost or forgotten. This also makes the knowledge acquired through 
experience more fragmented and more difficult to interpret and utilise in subsequent re-entry decisions.  
 In contrast, when a firm operates in an environment characterized by relatively higher quality 
institutions, knowledge and experience resources may become augmented and, all else considered, 
firms have no motivation to delay their re-entries. Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The positive effect of length of experience on speed of re-entry is stronger if the firm 
has experienced a host environment with a higher level of institutional quality.  
 
Second, the quality of host institutions can moderate the negative effect of depth of experience on the 
speed of re-entry, i.e. by reducing it. The presumption of higher host institutional quality may reduce 
ambiguity because the risk of being vulnerable and possibly incurring further loss is diminished through 
trust in institutions that managers understand. Since trust can originate from outside relationships, on 
the basis of institutional quality (Noteboom, 2007), countries vary in the extent to which there are 
institutions that support trust. Where the quality of host institutional environments is reduced, trust can 
be fragile and firms may feel more vulnerable to the abuse of host institutional actors or their 
opportunistic behavior (Dau, 2018; Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Zeng et al., 2013). Henisz and Zelner 
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(2005) highlighted that foreign investors tend to have the upper hand prior to making a significant 
investment in countries characterized by low quality institutions, where local firms need access to scarce 
capital and new technologies, but this influence is reduced when capital is invested in a market and the 
expertise is already diffused. In contrast to simple market transactions, significant investments are based 
at least to some extent on interacting, and sharing knowledge and prior experiences, with local 
stakeholders such as partners, suppliers, distributors, regulators and so on. When managers trust in 
relationships established with local actors, institutions are perceived as more credible and the negative 
effects associated with for instance, divesting a wholly owned subsidiary, may become reduced. We 
argue that trust in institutions may lead firms which have previously been more deeply involved in the 
host market not to delay their re-entries when host institutional quality is high.  
 
Hypothesis 6: The negative effect of depth of experience on speed of re-entry is weaker if the firm has 
experienced a host environment with a higher level of institutional quality.  
 
Third and relatedly, the lack of trust arising from the absence of specialised intermediaries, regulatory 
systems and contract-enforcing mechanisms may hamper the implementation of new, potentially 
improved strategies (Khanna et al., 2005). When host environments are characterized by weaker 
quality/ambiguous institutions, firms require more time to identify the root cause of their mistakes and 
devise better re-entry strategies. For instance, if re-entrants cannot find skilled market intermediaries to 
inform them about customer demand and enable re-entrants to adapt their strategies, then those re-
entrants may take longer to revisit their strategies which will delay re-entry. Galleries Lafayette (France) 
re-entered China in 2013, after having exited in the late 1990s due to poor demand for their products. 
The company had difficulties differentiating themselves in the market from competitors and faced 
challenges to obtaining information regarding the factors determining their customers’ increased 
willingness to pay for fashion items. Consequently, the company waited to find an experienced and 
reliable joint venture partner who helped them learn about the market and refocus strategic efforts on 
the high-end niche market segment. In contrast, firms entering high quality institutional environments 
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can be expected to take for granted the important role played by institutions in the execution of their 
strategies (Khanna et al., 2005; Meyer et al., 2009; Surdu et al., 2018b). Thus, we hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 7: The positive effect of the nature of experience on speed of re-entry is stronger if the firm 
has experienced a host environment with a higher level of institutional quality.  
 
An overview of the hypothesized relationships between experience types, host institutional quality and 
re-entry speed is presented in Figure I. 
 
--- Insert FIGURE I about here --- 
 
3. Methods 
 
There are no established databases from which to obtain data concerning MNE market re-entry. This 
obliged us to collect data from reports in the global business information and research databases Factiva 
(owned by Dow Jones) and LexisNexis (owned by Reed Elsevier). These databases contain information 
on the business activities of firms as reported by over 600 continuously updated newswires. These 
newswires include publicly available and licensed sources, such as, but not limited to, Wall Street 
Journal, Reuters, The New York Times, Bloomberg, and Nikkei; research databases such as Factiva and 
LexisNexis are increasingly used to examine under researched MNE strategies (see Surdu et al., 2018b).  
 Scholars also recognise the value of content analyses to extracting replicable and valid 
inferences from a large body of text (see Gaur and Kumar, 2018). We insured inter-coder reliability by 
developing a systematic, predominantly deductive coding scheme. Data collection and data coding 
processes are cited as the most critical steps to achieving reliability and validity in content analyses 
(Gaur and Kumar, 2018) and consequently, we discuss these processes in detail. 
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3.1. Data source and data collection 
Data searches in Factiva and LexisNexis can be conducted by region, subject, industry, time frame and 
company metadata. In this study, we decided to make no exclusions based on home country, host 
country, time of exit, time of re-entry, specific companies or industries, and used keyword searches 
instead. The next stage was therefore deciding on the key words used to identify foreign market re-entry 
phenomena first in Factiva and subsequently in LexisNexis for reliability checks. For this, we used 
Welch and Welch's (2009, p. 568) definition of re-entry as “a process involving a period of international 
business activity, then exit from international operations, followed by a time-out period of some 
duration, then a process of international re-entry, concluding with successfully renewed international 
operations”. The list of key words we used consisted of references to a firm re-entering a foreign market 
after exit, namely ‘re-entry’/ ‘re-enter’ / ‘return to’ / ‘back in’ / 're-internat*' AND ‘market’. Our search 
terms are purposefully broad to ensure that we capture the phenomena studied. Following these 
searches, over 200,000 business news articles were accessed and downloaded into pdf format. Next, 
each article was scanned to eliminate those articles where the focus of the news story was not on an 
organization re-entering a host market, as well as duplicates given that Factiva and LexisNexis collected 
data from similar sources. A total of 2810 articles corresponding to 1377 re-entry events were identified.  
 We note that although the definition of foreign market re-entry as provided by Welch and 
Welch (2009) is straightforward, we provide some further clarifications in order to enable replication 
of this study. (1) There are dissimilar views on what constitutes foreign market exit or withdrawal. 
Some evidence indicates that firms go through periods of increasing and decreasing their international 
commitment in a market (Vissak and Francioni, 2013). To create a data set for analysis, only cases of 
total market exit were included in the sample, which led to the elimination of 40 articles. This decision 
is in accord with scholars who maintain that the reasons for reducing and subsequently enhancing 
international operations should be studied separately (Surdu et al., 2018b). (2) The definition of foreign 
market re-entry refers to the firm level of analysis, in that it considers companies that have exited foreign 
operations whilst maintaining a domestic presence prior to re-entry. Although entrepreneurs – who may 
sell a company and re-enter with a different firm – may be an interesting group of re-entrants, this 
phenomenon is beyond the scope of this study and led to the elimination of 22 articles. (3) This data 
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sample does not include firms which exited one foreign market and subsequently entered a different 
market because this activity is analytically different from the focus of this study; as a result, 19 articles 
were eliminated. (4) Following the initial identification of re-entry, further searches in the databases are 
necessary to confirm that a given firm had, in fact, re-entered a previously exited market. Consequently, 
57 articles were eliminated because data concerning re-entry was speculative. (5) Project operations are 
a dominant mode of international expansion for some firms (e.g., in the construction sector) which 
regularly exit and re-enter markets because this process is an inherent part of their business model 
(Vissak and Francioni, 2013). Consequently, 32 articles were excluded from the database because they 
involved project-based businesses. (6) Another 287 articles were eliminated as they referred to domestic 
market exit, i.e. exit from an industry sector, followed by re-entry into that sector. (7) We only included 
in our sample re-entrants that had been out of the market for at least one year in order to avoid cases of 
partial market exit. This led to 25 articles being eliminated. The observation period starts in 1980 and 
ends in 2016 and includes a total of 2328 news articles corresponding to 1020 events, that is, all re-
entry events which have been identified in the databases and are in line with the scope of the study. Key 
characteristics of the sample are provided in Table I. 
--- Insert TABLE I about here --- 
3.2. Data coding 
Our coding scheme is theory driven (Gaur and Kumar, 2018), which is reflected in the deductive 
approach to content analysis undertaken in this study, whereby we use the antecedents and strategies 
examined with initial market entry and exit to inform a body of knowledge on re-entry. Yet, new codes 
also emerged following our pilot test of 100 re-entrants.  
 We started the coding process with the following codes to analyse the data collected from the 
business news reports: (1) name of the firm; (2) industry; (3) home country; (4) host country; (5) year 
of initial entry; (6) year of exit1; (7) year of re-entry2; (8) mode of operation; and (9) motives for the 
exit. Events of foreign market re-entry were compiled from interviews with key managers, CEOs and 
industry analysts conducted by journalists around the time of market exit and around the time of re-
                                                 
1 (6), (5) We used this data to calculate our "EXPERIENCE_LENGTH" variable. 
2 (7), (6) We used this data to calculate the "speed of re-entry". 
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entry. These reports tended to contain data regarding the specific years in which the firm initially 
entered, exited and re-entered the market, as well as qualitative information, such as the motivations of 
a firm to exit the host market and the mode in which the firm was operating in the market during the 
initial entry. We used previous classifications to distinguish between operation modes and we made no 
exclusions to the operation modes selected, namely: (i) exports; (ii) non-equity alliances (franchising, 
licensing); (iii) joint ventures; and (iv) wholly owned subsidiaries. To codify the motives for exit, we 
also used widely accepted classifications of exit motives (Benito and Welch, 1997; Benito, 2005; 
Mellahi, 2003). Previous classifications of market exit agree that exit can be seen as (i) voluntary, i.e. 
the firm chooses to abandon the market itself and (ii) involuntary, i.e. the firm is pressured by local 
governments to exit. Each author used these codes in the pilot test. 
 During the pilot test, some new insights emerged which were later incorporated in the final 
coding frame. Specifically, all four authors found that firms often list two or more factors associated 
with having exited the market which requires further unpacking of these categories of factors. Within 
the category of (i) voluntary exits, exit due to poor market performance is referred to as (a) lack of 
understanding of consumer needs resulting in misfit of product to market; (b) inappropriate pricing 
strategies; (c) competition leading to loss of market share. Further, three of the four authors discovered 
that managers made a distinction between exit due to poor market performance and exit due to poor 
performance with the operation mode. Hence, we include these sub-categories of voluntary exit in the 
final coding framework. All four coders highlighted that amongst multi-business firms, some would 
exit a sector in the host market, whereas they remained to operate there in another sector, hence, we 
added a new code to capture the potential effect of being present in the market. As discussed in the 
following sections, the content analysis from Factiva/LexisNexis was supplemented with information 
collected about firm characteristics, e.g. size, age, general internationalisation experience, (Annual 
reports/Company history) and host institutional quality (Economic Freedom of the World Index).  
 
 
3.3. Variables 
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3.3.1. Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is the speed of re-entry measured as the period of time between two well-
observed events namely the event of exit and the event of re-entry. Previously, this has been referred to 
as the time-out period (Welch and Welch, 2009; Surdu et al., 2018b).   
3.3.2. Independent variables 
Our operationalisation of experience effects is premised on the perspective that host market specific 
knowledge is obtained through experience of operating in the previously exited market. 
EXPERIENCE_LENGTH is measured as the number of years the firm operated in the host market 
between initial entry and exit. As in previous studies (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Eriksson and 
Chetty, 2003; García-García et al., 2017), EXPERIENCE_DEPTH is a measure of knowledge acquired 
through commitment in a foreign market and reflected in the mode of operation in that market, hence, 
operation mode was coded in the database into four dummy variables namely: EXPORTS, 
NONEQ_ALLIANCES, JV and WOS. Each variable representing a mode of operation takes turns as 
an independent variable in the regression to allow for comparisons. EXPERIENCE_NATURE reflects 
the motives for the exit. After using Factiva and LexisNexis to identify why re-entrants had exited the 
market based on previous classifications of exit, three dummy variables were created, namely: poor 
market performance (POORMKT_PERFORMANCE), poor performance with the initial mode of 
operation (POORMODE_PERFORMANCE) and involuntary exit (INVOLUNTARY_EXIT). We 
found that the factors associated by re-entrants with poor market performance (i.e. lack of understanding 
of consumer needs resulting in misfit of product to market, inappropriate pricing strategies and 
competition leading to loss of market share) were highly correlated, since misunderstanding of customer 
tastes may lead to unsatisfactory market performance, whereas local competitors tend to have locally 
adapted products and services. The study tested for the effect on re-entry speed of firms exiting 
voluntarily compared to being forced out of the market (as a re-entrant cannot simultaneously exit 
voluntarily and involuntarily).3  
                                                 
3 For robustness checks we added each exit motivation to the model separately. This did not change the effect of 
the relationships between exit and re-entry commitment strategies.  
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 Host institutional quality is measured using data from the Economic Freedom of the World 
Index, which is viewed as a quality measure of a country's institutional and policy environments (Meyer 
et al., 2009). The composite index is based on five main areas: 1) size of government, 2) legal system 
and intellectual property rights (IPR), 3) sound money, 4) freedom to trade internationally, and 5) 
regulation. Countries are ranked across a spectrum from most free (minimal state intervention = ‘10’) 
to least free (dominant state intervention = ‘0’). Host institutional quality is measured at time t-1, with 
a one-year lag prior to exit. Given that previous research found high correlations between institutional 
scores (Meyer et al., 2009; Xia et al., 2009), factor analysis resulted in two measures of institutional 
quality being used. Legal system and intellectual property rights, sound money, freedom to trade 
internationally and regulation loaded onto one factor - HOST_QUAL (1) and size of government loaded 
onto another factor - HOST_QUAL (2). HOST_QUAL (2) reflects whether the country relies on 
personal choice and markets rather than government budgets and political choices. This means that high 
income countries may score high for the other factors and low for size of the government whilst the 
opposite is valid for low income countries.4 
 
3.3.3. Control variables 
Firm size (LNSIZE) is measured as total number of assets (Delios and Henisz, 2003), with a logarithm 
transformation at t-1 exit. Firm age (AGE) is measured as the number of years (Zhou and Wu, 2014) 
from foundation until t-1 exit. We also controlled for other experience related factors (Luo and Peng, 
1999; Brouthers et al., 2008). The total number of international countries entered since inception was 
measured (NCOUNTRY_INT) as was the total number of international countries within the host region 
entered since inception (NCOUNTRY_HOST), both calculated at t-1 exit. General experience intensity 
(total number of years of internationalisation, NYEARS_INT) and host experience intensity (total 
number of years in the host region, NYEARS_HOST) were also calculated at t-1 exit. Similar to 
                                                 
4 We compiled data to measure institutional quality from other databases such as the World Bank that have been 
used in previous research (e.g. Meyer et al., 2009; Xia et al., 2009) and did not find significant differences; e.g. 
‘freedom to trade internationally’ is correlated with ‘regulatory quality’ (r=0.71) and ‘property rights’ (r=0.75). 
Gwartney and Lawson (2003) also noted that, when the components of the index are highly correlated (ranging 
from 0.59 to 0.93) the ratings and rankings of institutional quality are not very sensitive to variations in the weights 
assigned to the components, the exception being ‘size of government’ which we also treat as a separate variable.  
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previous studies, factor analysis confirmed that the two measures of experience intensity loaded onto a 
single factor (NYEARS, Cronbach’s alpha = .82) (see also Brouthers et al., 2008). The variable 
capturing whether the re-entrant was already present in the market is PRIOR_PRESENCE; the variable 
takes the value of "1" if following the exit event, a re-entrant continued to operate in the host market 
through a different division or in a different market sector, and "0" otherwise. Further, we controlled 
for whether re-entrants tend to feel more confident in the usefulness of knowledge possessed and re-
enter faster into countries within their home region (Surdu et al., 2018b); the variable REG takes the 
value of ‘1’ when the home and host countries are within the same region (regionalisation patterns are 
between countries within the European Union, North America, Latin America, Asia, Australia and New 
Zealand and Africa). Finally, we have four industry dummies representing the top industries in our 
sample: AUTOMOTIVE, RETAIL, FINANCIAL SERVICES and CONSUMER ELECTRONICS. 
The standard deviations and pairwise correlations for all the variables are reported in Table II. The 
VIFs range between 1.08 and 3.24, suggesting no serious problems of multicollinearity for the analysis. 
--- Insert TABLE II about here ---  
 
3.4. Modelling procedure: Cox proportional hazards model 
Our hypotheses are tested using the Proportional Hazards Model analysis developed by Cox (1972). 
Cox's proportional hazards model is amongst the most commonly used regression analysis models to 
investigate what is generally referred to as survival data. Based on the hazard function, the rate of 
occurrence of the re-entry event at duration t equals the density of events at t divided by the probability 
of the focal event occurring at a pre-determined point in time, i.e. firms re-entering the market within 
two years (five years) (ten years) after exiting that market. In a proportional hazards model, the unique 
effect of a unit increase in a covariate is multiplicative with regards to the hazard rate that the event has 
occurred at a time t. For instance, having greater length of experience may mean that the firm does not 
have to wait more than one or two years to re-enter in the same way in which divesting a wholly owned 
subsidiary may translate into firms re-entering ten years after exiting, a period of time that may be 
necessary for them to recoup their losses before re-entering. Covariates can be both continuous (length 
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of experience, host institutional quality) or binary (depth of experience, nature of experience). In the 
case of a continuous variable, the exact effect of the covariate depends on the baseline hazard function. 
Fuentelsaz et al. (2002: 252) explained in more detail that the main assumption of the hazards model is 
that ‘the hazard functions of all individuals are a multiple of an unspecified baseline hazard function. 
Therefore, the baseline hazard function is an arbitrary and non-negative function in time’. In this study 
- much like in all additive models - we expect that the effect of the covariates is the same at all times t, 
with each unit increase in the covariate resulting in proportional scaling of the hazard.  
 We also recognise that the proportional hazards model has seen a number of extensions since 
the original Cox design (1972). Notable amongst those extensions is the idea of considering specific 
time scales or intervals in which certain events have occurred (Andersen and Gill, 1982). The majority 
of previous studies on the timing/speed of initial market entry tend to examine the order of entry into 
foreign markets by considering whether firms define themselves as ‘first movers’, ‘early followers’ or 
‘late followers’ (c.f. Isobe et al., 2000). Given the potential biases arising from this method, scholars 
have recommended the use of actual time periods of entry (see Gaba et al., 2002, p. 41). The time-out 
period between exit and subsequent re-entry varies between one year and 20 years, thus allowing us to 
investigate the covariates associated with entry at different points in time. We used the SPSS statistical 
package to divide the speed of re-entry into four equal quartiles: "one to two years", "three to five 
years", "six to ten years" and "eleven to twenty years". In this way, we are able to provide a more 
nuanced explanation concerning what drives the speed of re-entry at different intervals of time and 
whether the factors determining re-entry within one or two years of exit have the same level of 
significance with the factors determining later re-entry, for instance, waiting more than 10 years prior 
to re-entering. Speed of re-entry was computed into three dichotomous variables, whereby in each 
observation the censored subject is taken into account as one whose event is ‘0’. We measured whether 
the firm re-entered within two years or waited longer (1;0); within five years or longer (1;0) and within 
ten years or longer (1;0). Given this established method of coding the data, each time-frame is compared 
to the remainder of the sample. 
 Survival models were developed for use with continuous data, however, such data is generally 
not available in studies of international business, which includes studies on the speed of foreign market 
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entry decisions (Fuentelsaz et al., 2002; Isobe et al., 2000). In this study, we have annual observations 
regarding the external, host market-related covariates by examining their value at the time of exit, 
because we assume that the assessment of risk and costs that managers make at the time of exit will 
influence how early they re-enter. Further, since we grouped the speed of re-entry as intervals, the model 
is time-dependent but remains fixed within specific time intervals as estimation takes place through the 
maximum likelihood technique (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995).   
 
 
4. Results 
In all tables, Model 1 presents the baseline estimation which includes the controls. The effects of 
experience are tested in Models 2-4. The individual effect of host institutional quality is subsequently 
added in Model 5. The effects of the interactions between experience and institutional quality are 
presented in Models 6-8. The estimated coefficients shown in Tables III-V should be interpreted as 
representing the increase (or decrease) in the expected log of the instantaneous re-entry rate with each 
additional unit of the covariate, e.g. a positive coefficient in Table III signifies an increase in the entry 
rate in the first two years of market exit which translates into a very early re-entry, whilst the converse 
is true for negative coefficients. The differences in the effects of experience and host institutional quality 
at different points in time confirmed our decision to unpack what constitutes early versus late re-entry. 
 With regard to the control variables: A large firm size is associated with foreign entrants 
possessing comparatively more financial and other resources that enable them to make riskier (re-)entry 
decisions (Gao and Pan, 2010; Fuentelsaz et al., 2002). Generally, our results show that SIZE has a 
negative effect on the speed or re-entry. This may be because larger firms remain focused on 
international growth by entering other foreign markets and may be less dependent on a small number 
of markets, thus postponing the re-entry decision into a market that may be viewed as more uncertain. 
Results suggest that older firms (AGE) re-enter within ten years after exit compared to waiting longer. 
Firms with prior presence in the market (PRIOR_PRESENCE) also re-enter relatively early, within five 
and ten years, but the effect is reduced when adding the covariates. Firms which have been international 
for a greater number of years (NYEARS) tend to re-enter after ten years. We also found evidence that 
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firms operating in the consumer electronics industry tend to re-enter within ten years, but not necessarily 
earlier. We found no evidence to suggest that firms overestimate the similarities between the home and 
host countries (Fuentelsaz et al., 2002) by re-entering earlier into neighbouring countries.  
 Our main findings are as follows: Contrary to findings in previous studies on initial entry 
(Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Gao and Pan, 2010) and contrary to 
our prediction in H1, EXPERIENCE_LENGTH does not have a positive effect on the speed of re-entry. 
In fact, the length of experience accumulated in the market between initial entry and exit delayed re-
entry, meaning that firms with more experience accumulated over time wait more than ten years to re-
enter. We argue that the length of experience alone may not be a key determent for early re-entry 
because some experiences may be too ambiguous to interpret (March, 2010) and learn from.  
 We found that other types of experiences have differing effects on re-entry speed. Firms which 
were previously operating via non-equity modes such as EXPORTS ( = -0.404, p-value <0.01) and 
NONEQ_ALLIANCES ( = -0.443, p-value <0.01) and firms which operated though WOSs ( = -
0.614, p-value <0.001) had a greater hazard to delay re-entry compared to JVs; these effects are most 
significant within five and ten years after exit (see for instance, Model 3 in Table IV). This means that 
JVs are more flexible not only compared to WOSs but also when compared to non-equity operation 
modes. Perhaps MNEs which operated via non-equity modes have not acquired the necessary know-
how to operate in the market and or attracted a large enough customer base and choose to re-enter when 
the market is more favourable and when there is demand for their products. What we also found is that 
the explanatory power of all three models significantly increases when EXPERIENCE_DEPTH is 
considered indicating that studies on speed of re-entry should examine depth of experience effects5.  
 Further, as suggested in H3, the coefficients for exit due to poor market (mode) performance 
have a strong positive effect on re-entry speed, decreasing the hazard of late re-entry in all three 
regression models. An explanation for the effects of POORMKT_PERFORMANCE in particular is that 
for firms which exited due to an increase in operation costs, competition or a misfit of product strategies, 
re-entry may involve changes in product, positioning, distribution and or pricing strategies. Such 
                                                 
5 It should be noted here that EXPORTS and NONEQ_ALLIANCES were also compared to WOS but given the 
non-significant results in all of the regression models, the results are not reported in the final models. 
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changes should be implemented when the experience is relatively fresh in the minds of the decision 
makers whereas the exact time it takes to make such changes may vary between re-entrants. Notable 
amongst the results concerning experience nature is also that the expected change in the log of re-entry 
rate is highest for POORMODE_PERFORMANCE for re-entry within two years, i.e.  = 1.158, p-
value <0.001 (Model 4 in Table III). Firms which have identified the mode of operation as the main 
cause behind their poor performance in the host market are, as hypothesized, incentivized to repair their 
mistakes, perhaps by even re-entering via a different mode (Surdu et al., 2018b).  
          The covariates measuring host institutional quality showed positive and highly significant 
coefficients, generally indicating, as proposed in H4, that high quality host institutional contexts reduce 
the uncertainty associated with delayed re-entries. The positive effect of INST_QUAL (1) is largest for 
firms re-entering within five years after exit ( = 0.332; p-value <0.001; Model 5 in Table IV) whereas 
the effect of INST_QUAL (2) is largest for re-entry within ten years ( = 0.142; p-value <0.001; Model 
5 in Table V). Within two and five years of exiting, weaknesses in other areas such as property rights, 
trade openness and sensible regulation are more immediately important, whilst aspects such as the size 
of government take longer to change and become more relevant in later stages following exit.  
--- Insert TABLES III-V here --- 
            
Next, we proposed that quality of institutions enhances the positive effects of prior experiences and 
reduce their negative effects. In H5 we predicted that, when a firm operates in an environment 
characterized by relatively higher quality institutions, knowledge and experience resources may become 
augmented. H5 is supported in that the interaction coefficients for INST_QUAL and EXPERIENCE 
LENGTH were positive in all models, although significant only for re-entry within five and ten years. 
This is aligned with our earlier findings that host institutional quality plays a lesser role in the early 
period after exit where experience is fresh in the minds of decision makers, whereas in later years, 
organizational forgetfulness together with difficulties in deciphering knowledge may increase the value 
of having operated in high quality institutional contexts.  
 25 
              In conditions of higher host institutional quality, the negative effect of EXPERIENCE_DEPTH 
on re-entry speed becomes mostly insignificant (H6); in particular results suggesting that knowledge 
acquired through WOSs tends to delay re-entry became insignificant. To elaborate on these findings, 
we represent graphically the interaction effects between host institutional quality and experience depth 
(Figure II). We defined institutional quality as low for values below the mean and high for values above 
the mean (see also Meschi, Ricard and Moore, 2017). We can draw several observations from Figure 
II. For instance, low levels of depth of experience acquired through exports and greater depth of 
experience such as that acquired through JVs and WOSs can be seen to increase the probability of early 
re-entry when host institutional quality is high and, conversely, decrease the probability of early re-
entry when host institutional quality is low. In turn, there is no clear variation in the effect of lower 
experience depth (acquired through non-equity alliances) at high and low levels of institutional quality. 
Figure II indicates that firms with the highest probability of early re-entry are those which were 
previously operating through joint ventures in high quality (low ambiguity) host environments.  
--- Insert Figure II here --- 
 
Finally, contrary to what we proposed in H7, we found that the nature of the experience, derived from 
the motives for exit is linked to earlier re-entries irrespective of other factors such as the host 
institutional environment, which confirms the important role of related experiences, such as the exit 
experience in shaping considerations for re-entry timing strategies.  
 
4.1. Supplementary analysis and robustness checks  
Our first robustness test considers the possibility that events occurring in the host market may drive the 
decision of when to exit the market, thus also influencing the time it takes for the firm to re-enter. We 
tested different year dummies to control for any variation that may result from the 2008 (2007, 2008, 
2009) recession in Western countries and the 1997 (1996, 1997, 1998) financial crisis in Asian 
countries, i.e. whether there was a concentration of market exit events around those periods which may 
prompt re-entries merely as a result of increased stability in the economic system. These robustness 
checks did not result in any observable changes for the results of our regression models. 
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 Our second robustness test evaluates the possibility that firms decide to reduce the time-out 
period in markets that are perceived as more attractive (Hsieh and Vermeulen, 2014). This may be the 
case with entering markets characterized by more uncertainty as well as high attractiveness due to their 
potential for future growth such as India, China, and more recently Russia and Brazil. The effect of host 
market size is measured as GDP per capita, based on purchasing power parity (PPP) to allow for a 
comparison of values over time and locations (World Bank indicators) and host market attractiveness, 
i.e. net inflows of FDI to the host market (World Bank indicators). Adding host market attractiveness 
did not lead to any change in the values of our parameters, however, the variable host market size incurs 
a high degree of multicollinearity with the institutional variable represented by covariate INST_QUAL 
(1). The correlation between host market size and host institutional quality can produce a misleading 
result since we have examples of markets such as China, India and other developing nations, which 
although considered institutionally underdeveloped and characterized by low economic freedom, are at 
the same time characterized by high growth rates and demand potential.  
 Our third robustness test considers the possibility that re-entries into a particular country may 
be consolidated into a short period of time, resulting from either a political decision to open for 
investment or other host market related factors we may have missed in our analysis. We evaluated our 
data according to the host region that firms re-entered (given that there are 101 host countries in total, 
it would have been less useful to stratify the data per country). We found that the time firms took to re-
enter in each host region had a range between 1 to 20 years, with mean values between 5-7 years and 
similar standard deviation values amongst the regions (between 4.64 and 6.15). There is no evidence 
that the effects of the covariates on speed of re-entry were biased by the host location. 
 Finally, we tested the robustness of our Cox hazard model results using the discriminant 
analysis procedure. The results of the two estimation procedures are similar with regards to the 
independent variables that significantly discriminate between the groups. For instance, for the variable 
EXPERIENCE_LENGTH, we can observe that firms which have not re-entered within ten years tend 
to have a higher mean. In turn, the mean for POORMODE_PERFORMANCE is significantly higher 
for earlier re-entries in all three contexts, with the difference decreasing over time. Similarly, for 
institutional quality, where the differences increase over time. The potential of the covariates to 
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contribute to the model varies according to the time frame studied. For instance, the covariates with 
greater discriminating ability when measuring re-entry within two years compared to later re-entrants 
are POORMODE_PERFORMANCE (0.760), INST_QUAL (1) (0.486), JV (0.331) and 
EXPERIENCE_LENGTH (-0.320). The covariates that best discriminate between firms engaging in 
re-entry within ten years compared to later re-entrants are INST_QUAL (1) (0.745), INST_QUAL (2) 
(0.498) and WOS (-0.315). The results are aligned with our interpretation of the Cox model.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
5.1. Contributions to theory 
We proposed that: (1) length and nature of experience can have an uncertainty reducing effect, whilst 
depth of experience can have an uncertainty-enhancing effect on speed of re-entry thereby delaying re-
entry; and that (2) a higher level of institutional quality translating into reduced institutional ambiguity 
strengthens the positive effects of prior experience and weaken their negative effects on re-entry speed. 
 This study contributes to the organizational learning and institutional theories in three ways. 
First, our results show that learning from length of experience accumulated in the market, commonly 
referred to as experience-based learning, does not have a positive effect on the speed of re-entry as 
previously suggested for de novo entries (e.g. Fuentelsaz et al., 2002; Gaba et al., 2002; Isobe et al., 
2000; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). More so, experienced re-entrants tend to be late re-entrants. Firms 
may need time to distill the lessons learned from previously operating in the host market, particularly 
as they simultaneously manage the potentially traumatic and costly market exit experience. Extant 
literature has not considered that experience takes time to become part of organizational learning and, 
as such, not all experiences may become embedded in organizational routines and positively influence 
organizational behavior in the short term. Noting that experiences do not take place in a context-free-
vacuum (Gaur et al., 2014; Teagarden, Von Glinow and Mellahi, 2018), firms may indirectly benefit 
from the quality of institutions because superior institutions provide a platform to learn from, and utilise 
past experiences. We show that experience may be more useful when MNEs encounter low levels of 
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ambiguity that disrupt the learning process, as in this case past experience may be more easily translated 
into organisational behaviors and routines (Anand, Mulotte and Ren, 2014).  
 We strongly argue that learning should be investigated not only as a linear, sequential process, 
whereby the firm accumulates experience which is translated into increased confidence in the capability 
to invest in an international market. Rather, experience accumulated over time may be set aside, 
disregarded and even forgotten (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011). It may be that the development of 
new learning that is required to make post-entry decisions occurs best under conditions where there are 
fewer routines to unlearn (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011; Tsang and Zahra, 2008).  
 Second, the present study provides a finely grained analysis of the impact of different types of 
experiences on the effectiveness of learning. We show that firms with little depth of experience and 
firms with significant depth of experience tend to be later re-entrants. Firms previously operating 
through modes such as exports, franchising or licensing, potentially lack the depth of knowledge 
necessary to re-enter the market relatively early nor have they necessarily planned a late re-entry. Since 
these firms are non-equity investors, institutional incentives do not necessarily represent a point of 
attraction for them. There may be fewer incentives to quickly recover the losses incurred upon exit 
which, in the case of firms operating via non-equity modes, would be reduced.  
            In turn, sharing equity and ownership with a partner may have reduced the costs of attaining 
deeper market knowledge (Gaba et al., 2002), whilst at the same time equipping the firm with a 
sufficient understanding of the market for the firm subsequently either to choose to terminate the 
investment, or to further invest in the market for greater control of its operations. Previous explanations 
for this have been that firms operating through joint ventures may find it easier to discover the gap that 
exists between extant and new knowledge and act towards reducing this gap and deepening their 
knowledge through early re-entry (see for instance, Delios and Beamish, 2004). Our findings reveal 
that overall, firms with the highest probability of early re-entry are those which were previously 
operating through joint ventures in high quality/low ambiguity host environments.  
 Further to this point, by considering the nature of the firm's prior experiences, our overall 
contention is that managers rely more on paradigms of interpretation of their negative experiences or 
market failures, particularly soon after having undergone those experiences. For re-entrants, poor 
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performance in the host market prior to exit appears to be an incentive to reinforce management 
commitment to the market through early re-entry. Furthermore, whilst we did not develop unique 
hypotheses about mediating effects, the results suggest that, when firms' experience was acquired via 
joint venture collaborations which subsequently underperformed in the market, the benefits of 
experience and flexibility acquired through partnerships tend to be reduced in the short term, leading to 
delayed decision making. Firms which have had experiences with failed joint venture partnerships may 
need to make inferences from the lessons learned after renouncing those partnerships and alter their 
investment strategies. Consequently, firms may make the wrong inferences from past experiences not 
only in the context of experiences associated with M&A failures (Zeng et al., 2013) but also when 
acquiring experiences such as operating via joint ventures. This, in turn, delays re-entry. 
Third, our findings confirm that MNEs evaluate the quality of host institutions and that high-
quality conditions are generally associated with less risk avoidance (Xia et al., 2009), and thus earlier 
re-entries. Over time, firms may forget or renounce their prior experiences in the market, or the 
organizational decision makers associated with those experiences may have left, making external, 
institutional cues very important in strategic decision making. Institutional quality also reduces the 
negative effect of experience accumulated over time confirming our proposition that the experience 
acquired in higher quality host institutional contexts is less ambiguous and therefore it becomes easier 
and faster for firms to codify, and make inferences from, past experiences. This makes the locational 
features of host markets also very important for firms considering international expansion and shows 
the need to contextualise the effects of experience and learning in international business strategies.  
 
5.2. Contributions to practice 
There may be significant hurdles to being late to the market, particularly if competitors have already 
established operations in those markets (as suggested by the example of Marks and Spencer who waited 
over ten years to re-enter various European markers and are yet to achieve success internationally). 
Organizational forgetfulness may occur when firms have spent a long time out of the market, in which 
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case there may be significant consequences of not having learned, or not being able to transform prior 
knowledge and experience into organizational learning and routines, and subsequently leverage the 
lessons learned from a failed experience when making subsequent market (re-)entry decisions. Firms 
either react and interpret market exit by changing their strategies and adapting to the market to avoid 
underperforming, or perhaps simply re-enter the market due to the limited options these firms have to 
grow through internationalization. In the latter case, re-entry would occur without the re-entrant firm 
having learned significantly. The locational features of (re-)entered markets are especially important 
for firms considering (re-)entry, with external cues being particularly relevant to those which wait 
longer before (re-)entering and for whom past knowledge may be less relevant to draw upon.  
            Whilst joint equity re-entries increase the likelihood of early re-entries, wholly owned 
subsidiaries tend to be relatively harder to implement and costlier to dissolve. Particularly if the MNE 
is then also to renew its market commitment through wholly owned subsidiaries (Putzhammer et al., 
2018; Surdu et al., 2018b), it may take significantly longer to set up greenfield ventures upon re-entry. 
Where acquisitions are concerned, they may foster earlier entries but they can be costlier and contingent 
on the availability of appropriate targets. Timing decisions are, to some degree, inter-linked with entry 
mode commitment choices (Gaba et al., 2002; Isobe et al., 2000) as we identified a trade-off between 
early (re-)entries and degree of commitment. Whilst it is proposed that the highest performers in foreign 
markets are MNEs that both (re-)enter early and through high resource commitment modes (Isobe et 
al., 2000), managers may need to consider the trade-off between investing significantly in a market and 
the speed of that investment particularly given the already high risks associated with an exited market. 
              We point to the relevance of understanding the hurdles of being late to the market. For example, 
Peugeot Citroën’s plans to re-enter the U.S. market came at a time when no French car manufacturers 
had been able to penetrate the market since the 1990s and is posited to be part of the company’s financial 
and strategic restructuring. This case illustrates the liability of being late to the market when all other 
automotive companies have established dealerships in the U.S. or even manufacturing subsidiaries. 
Partnerships have not worked in the U.S. market for companies such as Groupe Renault (France), which 
places further constraints on the usefulness of past experience as a long time has passed since their exit 
(the 1970s for Citroën and 1990s for Peugeot) and unsurprisingly, no dealerships of Citroën or Peugeot 
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still exist in the U.S. for them to acquire market knowledge from. Such examples further emphasise the 
importance of not waiting too long before re-entering a previously exited market.  
 
5.3. Limitations and future research 
We do not have information on how much of a firm's past experience is transferable, what has been 
forgotten or disregarded, or whether firms rely on new knowledge to become early re-entrants. Further 
qualitative data is required to understand how managers recall the exit experience and how much of that 
experience is embedded within the organization, lies with the individual decision makers involved 
(Zucchella, Palamara and Denicolai, 2007), or is lost when key decision makers are replaced following 
the exit. Smaller firms, international new ventures and or family firms (which are potentially newer to 
foreign entry and implicitly re-entry) may vary more in their experience resources. These firms differ 
from the typical large and hierarchical MNEs with regards to how and where learning is stored within 
the organization and how it becomes transformed into organizational routines. The knowledge and 
experience accumulated by smaller multinationals is tacit and thus cannot be explicitly codified 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) in which case it becomes embedded in individual decision makers. 
Research that examines re-entries of smaller firms may explain whether experience accumulated over 
time may result in learning that can be exploited in the short term by re-entrants. 
A fruitful avenue for future research would be to examine not only the characteristics of the 
firm's external, host environment but also the distance between the institutions and cultures of home 
and host markets (Bhaumik, Owolabi and Pal, 2018) as it may have an impact on how experiences are 
perceived. Informal ties between countries, such as those associated with cultural similarities, may also 
affect the ease with which the knowledge acquired through experiences can be understood and 
communicated. In a similar manner to institutions, historical ties provide incentives for economic 
exchanges as they increase receptivity to investment from the perspective of local stakeholders and 
lower perceived costs and psychological barriers of investors. 
             In conclusion, our findings provoke a renewal and revision of the bounded organisational 
learning theories as we posit that learning does not take place in a vacuum, isolated from any external 
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influences. Organisational learning is a dynamic and contingent process, one highly dependent on the 
characteristics of the MNE's experiences and on the quality of its institutional context. Our hope is that 
by introducing institutional theory to the context of organisational learning, we will inspire research 
which considers the many other contextual factors which may have significant implications toward the 
idea of developing "learning organizations", and subsequently on the strategic choices made by them. 
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Figure I. A conceptualisation of the determinants of foreign market re-entry speed 
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Table I. Sample description of foreign market re-entry events (N=1,020) 
 
  
 No. of re-entry events % 
Panel A: Time period distribution    
1980s 32 3.1 
1990s 173 17.0 
2000-2010 350 34.3 
2011-2016 465 45.6 
Panel B: Host market re-entered (top 5)   
India  147 14.4 
China  76 7.5 
South Africa  74 7.3 
US 67 6.6 
UK 52 5.1 
Panel C: Home market of re-entrant (top 5)   
US 312 30.6 
UK 120 5.9 
Japan 87 8.5 
Italy  56 5.5 
Germany  49 4.8 
Panel D: Major industries   
Automotive  209 20.5 
Financial services  171 16.8 
Retail 113 11.1 
Consumer electronics  85 8.3 
Home - Host Location   
EU - EU 130 out of 413 EU firm re-entrants 12.7 
N AM - N AM 6 out of 335 North American firm re-entrants 0.59 
S AM - S AM 2 out of 8 South American re-entrants 0.10 
ASIA - ASIA 137 out of 223 Asian firm re-entrants 13.4 
Australia and NZ -  Australia and NZ 4 out of 19 Autralian and NZ firm re-entrants 0.39 
Africa - Africa 10 out of 22 African firm re-entrants 0.98 
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Table II. Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for speed of re-entry (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05) 
Variables 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
(1) EXPERIENCE_LENGTH 21.49 18.13 975 1                    
    
(2) EXPORTS 0.48 0.37 937 .01 1                   
    
(3) NONEQ_ALLIANCES 0.36 0.16 937 -.08* 
.10 
** 
1                  
    
(4) JV 0.38 0.18 937 -.06* .07* 
.28 
** 
1                 
    
(5) WOS 0.45 0.28 937 
.11 
** 
-.19 
** 
-.20 
** 
.09 
** 
1                
    
(6) POORMKT_PERFORMANCE 0.48 0.62 975 -.07 
.09 
** 
.04 
-.13 
** 
-.02 1               
    
(7) POORMODE_PERFORMANCE 0.40 0.20 975 
-.13 
** 
-.08 
* 
.06 
.28 
** 
-.21 
** 
-.44 
** 
1              
    
(8) INST_QUAL_Size of government 1.35 5.97 877 -.04 .03 .07* .02 -.01 -.02 .08* 1             
    
(9) INST_QUAL_ Legal system and 
IPR 
1.80 6.11 877 -.07* 
.28 
** 
-.00 
.10 
** 
.03 
.27 
** 
-.00 -.01 1            
    
(10) INST_QUAL_Sound money 2.00 7.67 877 -.00 
.17 
** 
.01 
.09 
** 
.03 
.15 
** 
.01 .01 
.60 
** 
1           
    
(11) INST_QUAL_Freedom to trade 1.95 6.73 877 -.06 
.25 
** 
.03 
.14 
** 
-.00 
.21 
** 
.04 
.14 
** 
.76 
** 
.65 
** 
1          
    
(12) INST_QUAL_Regulation 1.47 6.41 877 -.04 
.23 
** 
.06 
.09 
** 
.03 
.17 
** 
.06 
.21 
** 
.66 
** 
.59 
** 
.67 
** 
1         
    
(13) LNSIZE 1.32 3.40 949 
.21 
** 
-.09 
** 
-.01 -.01 .01 -.08* -.01 -.02 
-.12 
** 
-.09 
** 
-.11 
** 
-.15 
** 
1        
    
(14) AGE 51.82 68.48 974 
.38 
** 
-.09 
** 
-.02 .05 -.08* 
-.08 
** 
-.03 -.01 
-.16 
** 
-.17 
** 
-.16 
** 
-.15 
** 
.32 
** 
1       
    
(15) NCOUNTRY_INT 47.62 59.25 869 
.05 
** 
.00 -.02 -.03 
.16 
** 
-.08* .01 .03 
-.15 
** 
-.13 
** 
-.17 
** 
-.12 
** 
.36 
** 
.11 
** 
1      
    
(16) NCOUNTRY_HOST 7.80 10.14 875 .04 .03 .01 -.04 .05 .01 -.03 -.05 
-.10 
** 
-.06 
-.12 
** 
-.12 
** 
.26 
** 
.06 
.34 
** 
1     
    
(17) NYEARS_INT 35.56 44.96 965 
.47 
** 
-.07* -.05 -.03 .06* -.04 -.05 .02 
.18 
** 
-.14 
** 
-.19 
** 
-.15 
** 
.37 
** 
.49 
** 
.33 
** 
.21 
** 
1    
    
(18) NYEARS_HOST 30.16 32.66 958 
.43 
** 
-.05 -.06 .00 .02 .00 -.06 -.01 
-.11 
** 
-.06 
-.13 
** 
-.09 
** 
.32 
** 
.47 
** 
.26 
** 
.21 
** 
.78 
** 
1   
    
(19) REG 0.47 0.33 975 .01 .79 -.05 .05 -.05 .05 -.06 
-.11 
** 
.07* .06 .06* .01 
-.10 
** 
-.13 
** 
-.24 
** 
.03 
-.22 
** 
-.10 
** 
1  
    
(20) PRIOR_PRESENCE 0.41 0.22 975 
.10 
** 
.11 
** 
-.03 .05 
.10 
** 
.14 
** 
-.03 .05 
.14 
** 
.06* 
.09 
** 
.08 
** 
.26 
** 
.11 
** 
.27 
** 
.12 
** 
.19 
** 
.19 
** 
-.05 1 
    
(21) AUTOMOTIVE  0.40 0.21 1020 
.10 
** 
.26 
** 
-.19 
** 
-.02 
-.12 
** 
.02 
.10 
** 
.19 .11 -.04 -.05 
-.08 
* 
.20 
** 
.00 
.21 
** 
.44 
** 
.25 
** 
.20 
** 
-.13 
** 
.18 
** 
1    
(22) RETAIL 0.31 0.11 1020 
-.12 
** 
-.13 
** 
.11 
** 
-.04 
.09 
** 
.05 
.09 
** 
-.05 
.09 
** 
.09 
** 
.10 
** 
.09 
** 
-.19 
** 
-.03 
-.10 
** 
-.16 
** 
-.17 
** 
-.16 
** 
.04 
-.14 
** 
-.18 
** 
1   
(23) FINANCIAL SERVICES 0.37 0.17 1020 
.19 
** 
-.15 
** 
-.17 
** 
.07* 
.24 
** 
-.09 
** 
-.12 
** 
-.04 
-.13 
** 
-.05 
-.09 
** 
-.09 
** 
.19 
** 
.34 
** 
-.10 
** 
-.23 
** 
.21 
** 
.21 
** 
.06 -.05 
-.23 
** 
-.16 
** 
1  
(24) CONSUMER ELECTRONICS 0.33 0.12 1020 -03 
.19 
** 
-.09 
** 
-.05 
-.09 
** 
.09 
** 
-.06 
* 
.02 .05 -.00 .01 .05 -.02 
-.09 
** 
.07* .04 -.04 -.07* .03 
.18 
** 
-.19 
** 
-.13 
** 
-.17 
** 
1 
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Table III: COX proportional hazard of re-entry within 2 years  
 
aThese variables correspond to EXPERIENCE_DEPTH.  
bThese variables correspond to EXPERIENCE_NATURE.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
                 
EXPERIENCE_LENGTH   
-0.009 
(0.060) 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.105) 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.398) 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.297) 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.179) 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.309) 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.365) 
(0.005) 
EXPORTS vs. JVa     
-0.428 
(0.021) 
(0.185) 
0.151 
(0.433) 
(0.192) 
-0.175 
(0.370) 
(0.195) 
-0.172 
(0.378) 
(0.195) 
-0.079 
(0.700) 
(0.204) 
0.147 
(0.453) 
(0.197) 
NONEQ_ALLIANCES vs. JVa     
-0.600 
(0.009) 
(0.231) 
0.481 
(0.041) 
(0.235) 
-0.515 
(0.030) 
(0.237) 
-0.506 
(0.033) 
(0.237) 
-0.350 
(0.161) 
(0.234) 
0.485 
(0.042) 
(0.238) 
WOS vs. JVa     
-0.558 
(0.007) 
(0.205) 
0.176 
(0.421) 
(0.219) 
-0.170 
(0.439) 
(0.220) 
-0.196 
(0.374) 
(0.221) 
-0.151 
(0.518) 
(0.151) 
0.151 
(0.494) 
(0.221) 
POORMKT_PERFORMANCEb 
 
 
     
0.484 
(0.013) 
(0.195) 
0.210 
(0.294) 
(0.200) 
0.193 
(0.338) 
(0.201) 
0.226 
(0.258) 
(0.200) 
0.248 
(0.220) 
(0.202) 
POORMODE_PERFORMANCEb 
 
 
     
1.158 
(0.000) 
(0.211) 
0.921 
(0.000) 
(0.212) 
0.896 
(0.000) 
(0.213) 
0.953 
(0.000) 
(0.213) 
0.934 
(0.000) 
(0.216) 
INST_QUAL (1) 
 
 
       
0.271 
(0.002) 
(0.087) 
0.244 
(0.033) 
(0.113) 
-0.446 
(0.337) 
(0.465) 
-0.106 
(0.685) 
(0.260) 
INST_QUAL (2) 
 
 
       
0.130 
(0.098) 
(0.078) 
0.001 
(0.995) 
(0.114) 
-0.565 
(0.196) 
(0.437) 
0.110 
(0.657) 
(0.249) 
INST_QUAL (1) x 
EXPERIENCE_LENGTH 
          
0.002 
(0.621) 
(0.005)     
INST_QUAL (2) x 
EXPERIENCE_LENGTH 
          
0.014 
(0.895) 
(0.102)     
INST_QUAL (1) x EXPORTS 
VS. JVa 
            
-0.308 
(0.179) 
(0.229)   
INST_QUAL (1) x 
NONEQ_ALLIANCES vs. JVa 
            
-0.536 
(0.047) 
(0.270)   
INST_QUAL (1) x WOS vs. JVa             
-0.092 
(0.696) 
(0.236)   
INST_QUAL (2) x EXPORTS 
VS. JVa 
            
-0.308 
(0.154) 
(0.216)   
INST_QUAL (2) x 
NONEQ_ALLIANCES vs. JVa 
            
-0.224 
(0.363) 
(0.247)   
INST_QUAL (2) x WOS vs. JV             
-0.409 
(0.076) 
(0.231)   
INST_QUAL (1) x 
POORMKT_PERFORMANCEb 
 
 
             
-0.301 
(0.151) 
(0.210) 
INST_QUAL (1) x 
POORMODE_PERFORMANCEb 
 
 
             
-0.290 
(0.194) 
(0.223) 
INST_QUAL (2) x 
POORMKT_PERFORMANCEb 
              
-0.068 
(0.747) 
(0.210) 
INST_QUAL (2) x 
POORMODE_PERFORMANCEb 
              
0.035 
(0.874) 
(0.220) 
Controls                  
LNSIZE 
0.019 
(0.749) 
(0.058) 
0.019 
(0.751) 
(0.059) 
0.014 
(0.811) 
(0.059) 
0.016 
(0.780) 
(0.059) 
0.025 
(0.680) 
(0.060) 
0.022 
(0.721) 
(0.061) 
0.023 
(0.708) 
(0.061) 
0.028 
(0.646) 
(0.061) 
AGE 
0.002 
(0.343) 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.295) 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.486) 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.507) 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.487) 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.461) 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.470) 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.508) 
(0.002) 
NCOUNTRY_INT 
-0.001 
(0.614) 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.591) 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.886) 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.603) 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.415) 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.399) 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.361) 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.426) 
(0.002) 
NCOUNTRY_HOST 
-0.004 
(0.675) 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.627) 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.544) 
(0.011) 
-0.008 
(0.462) 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.636) 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.617) 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.522) 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.708) 
(0.011) 
NYEARS 
-0.152 
(0.131) 
(0.100) 
-0.069 
(0.520) 
(0.108) 
-0.067 
(0.536) 
(0.109) 
-0.094 
(0.379) 
(0.107) 
-0.058 
(0.592) 
(0.109) 
-0.054 
(0.617) 
(0.109) 
-0.049 
(0.652) 
(0.109) 
-0.066 
(0.546) 
(0.110) 
REG 
0.070 
(0.932) 
(0.154) 
0.070 
(0.648) 
(0.154) 
0.071 
(0.648) 
(0.155) 
0.144 
(0.355) 
(0.156) 
0.166 
(0.294) 
(0.158) 
0.181 
(0.253) 
(0.159) 
0.154 
(0.331) 
(0.159) 
0.133 
(0.402) 
(0.159) 
PRIOR_PRESENCE 
0.076 
(0.927) 
(0.177) 
0.070 
(0.690) 
(0.176) 
0.025 
(0.887) 
(0.177) 
-0.002 
(0.989) 
(0.182) 
-0.135 
(0.467) 
(0.186) 
-0.140 
(0.453) 
(0.186) 
-0.126 
(0.501) 
(0.187) 
-0.139 
(0.456) 
(0.186) 
AUTOMOTIVE 
-0.025 
(0.909) 
(0.218) 
-0.024 
(0.912) 
(0.219) 
-0.115 
(0.613) 
(0.228) 
-0.328 
(0.158) 
(0.232) 
-0.315 
(0.187) 
(0.239) 
-0.335 
(0.164) 
(0.241) 
-0.310 
(0.197) 
(0.240) 
-0.333 
(0.168) 
(0.242) 
RETAIL 
0.014 
(0.986) 
(0.227) 
-0.002 
(0.994) 
(0.227) 
0.040 
(0.862) 
(0.229) 
-0.117 
(0.610) 
(0.229) 
-0.127 
(0.582) 
(0.231) 
-0.124 
(0.592) 
(0.231) 
-0.170 
(0.465) 
(0.233) 
-0.124 
(0.594) 
(0.232) 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 
-0.427 
(0.086) 
(0.248) 
-0.378 
(0.126) 
(0.247) 
-0.335 
(0.184) 
(0.252) 
-0.219 
(0.384) 
(0.252) 
-0.101 
(0.692) 
(0.256) 
-0.126 
(0.624) 
(0.257) 
-0.044 
(0.867) 
(0.261) 
-0.065 
(0.802) 
(0.258) 
CONSUMER ELECTRONICS 
0.159 
(0.853) 
(0.219) 
0.167 
(0.447) 
(0.219) 
0.172 
(0.447) 
(0.227) 
0.132 
(0.561) 
(0.228) 
0.177 
(0.441) 
(0.230) 
0.178 
(0.440) 
(0.230) 
0.168 
(0.464) 
(0.230) 
0.179 
(0.438) 
(0.231) 
N 849 848 814 814 749 749 749 749 
-2 Log Likelihood 2767.9 2763.9 2710.7 2678.6 2614.9 2611.9 2606.9 2612.1 
Chi-Square 
9.832 
(0.546) 
12.752 
(0.387) 
22.546 
(0.094) 
59.072 
(0.000) 
56.748 
(0.000) 
57.535 
(0.000) 
66.987 
(0.000) 
58.600 
(0.000) 
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Table IV: COX proportional hazard of re-entry within 5 years 
 
aThese variables correspond to EXPERIENCE_DEPTH.  
bThese variables correspond to EXPERIENCE_NATURE.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
                 
EXPERIENCE_LENGTH   
-0.009 
(0.008) 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.020) 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.103) 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.063) 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.025) 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.074) 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.088) 
(0.003) 
EXPORTS vs. JVa     
-0.404 
(0.003) 
(0.134) 
0.280 
(0.044) 
(0.139) 
-0.284 
(0.046) 
(0.142) 
0.285 
(0.047) 
(0.143) 
-0.215 
(0.143) 
(0.147) 
0.256 
(0.077) 
(0.145) 
NONEQ_ALLIANCES vs. JVa     
-0.443 
(0.006) 
(0.160) 
0.395 
(0.015) 
(0.163) 
-0.450 
(0.007) 
(0.168) 
0.440 
(0.009) 
(0.168) 
-0.290 
(0.090) 
(0.171) 
0.424 
(0.012) 
(0.169) 
WOS vs. JVa     
-0.614 
(0.000) 
(0.148) 
0.431 
(0.006) 
(0.156) 
-0.385 
(0.014) 
(0.157) 
0.413 
(0.009) 
(0.158) 
-0.362 
(0.027) 
(0.164) 
0.364 
(0.022) 
(0.159) 
POORMKT_PERFORMANCEb       
0.333 
(0.008) 
(0.126) 
0.056 
(0.667) 
(0.131) 
0.037 
(0.778) 
(0.132) 
0.096 
(0.463) 
(0.131) 
0.079 
(0.551) 
(0.133) 
POORMODE_PERFORMANCEb       
0.006 
(0.103) 
(0.003) 
0.436 
(0.004) 
(0.150) 
-0.406 
(0.007) 
(0.150) 
0.483 
(0.001) 
(0.151) 
-0.192 
(0.221) 
(0.157) 
INST_QUAL (1)         
0.332 
(0.000) 
(0.059) 
0.290 
(0.000) 
(0.078) 
-0.557 
(0.089) 
(0.327) 
0.094 
(0.601) 
(0.181) 
INST_QUAL (2)         
0.071 
(0.177) 
(0.053) 
-0.069 
(0.328) 
(0.071) 
-0.417 
(0.162) 
(0.298) 
-0.012 
(0.942) 
(0.167) 
INST_QUAL (1) x 
EXPERIENCE_LENGTH 
          
0.002 
(0.556) 
(0.003)     
INST_QUAL (2) x 
EXPERIENCE_LENGTH 
          
0.010 
(0.005) 
(0.004)     
INST_QUAL (1) x EXPORTS vs. 
JVa 
            
-0.389 
(0.016) 
(0.162)   
INST_QUAL (1) x 
NONEQ_ALLIANCES vs. JVa 
            
-0.600 
(0.001) 
(0.186)   
INST_QUAL (1) x WOS vs. JVa             
-0.200 
(0.233) 
(0.167)   
INST_QUAL (2) x EXPORTS vs. 
JVa 
            
-0.221 
(0.136) 
(0.148)   
INST_QUAL (2) x 
NONEQ_ALLIANCES vs. JVa 
            
-0.273 
(0.087) 
(0.160)   
INST_QUAL (2) x WOS vs. JVa             
-0.173 
(0.295) 
(0.165)   
INST_QUAL (1) x 
POORMKT_PERFORMANCEb 
              
-0.155 
(0.241) 
(0.132) 
INST_QUAL (1) x 
POORMODE_PERFORMANCEb 
              
-0.192 
(0.221) 
(0.157) 
INST_QUAL (2) x 
POORMKT_PERFORMANCEb 
              
-0.112 
(0.390) 
(0.130) 
INST_QUAL (2) x 
POORMODE_PERFORMANCEb 
              
-0.032 
(0.829) 
(0.149) 
Controls                  
LNSIZE 
-0.108 
(0.006) 
(0.040) 
-0.107 
(0.007) 
(0.040) 
-0.104 
(0.009) 
(0.040) 
-0.102 
(0.011) 
(0.040) 
-0.087 
(0.038) 
(0.042) 
-0.092 
(0.029) 
(0.042) 
-0.083 
(0.049) 
(0.042) 
-0.086 
(0.041) 
(0.042) 
AGE 
0.001 
(0.377) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.277) 
(0.001) 
(0.001) 
(0.623) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.576) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.526) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.499) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.510) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.559) 
(0.001) 
NCOUNTRY_INT 
-0.001 
(0.635) 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.544) 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.872) 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.714) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.336) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.338) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.334) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.329) 
(0.001) 
NCOUNTRY_HOST 
-0.005 
(0.491) 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.429) 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.329) 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.265) 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.584) 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.560) 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.478) 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.667) 
(0.008) 
NYEARS 
-0.157 
(0.026) 
(0.070) 
-0.074 
(0.325) 
(0.075) 
-0.056 
(0.465) 
(0.077) 
-0.077 
(0.312) 
(0.076) 
-0.029 
(0.707) 
(0.078) 
-0.026 
(0.742) 
(0.078) 
-0.029 
(0.706) 
(0.078) 
-0.032 
(0.679) 
(0.078) 
REG 
0.147 
(0.171) 
(0.107) 
0.141 
(0.190) 
(0.107) 
0.128 
(0.235) 
(0.108) 
0.154 
(0.157) 
(0.109) 
0.171 
(0.124) 
(0.111) 
0.189 
(0.091) 
(0.112) 
0.155 
(0.166) 
(0.112) 
0.151 
(0.177) 
(0.112) 
PRIOR_PRESENCE 
0.316 
(0.009) 
(0.122) 
0.306 
(0.012) 
(0.121) 
0.271 
(0.027) 
(0.123) 
0.221 
(0.077) 
(0.125) 
0.036 
(0.778) 
(0.129) 
0.028 
(0.829) 
(0.129) 
0.033 
(0.801) 
(0.130) 
0.028 
(0.827) 
(0.129) 
AUTOMOTIVE 
-0.023 
(0.885) 
(0.156) 
-0.010 
(0.952) 
(0.157) 
-0.122 
(0.458) 
(0.164) 
-0.230 
(0.168) 
(0.166) 
-0.218 
(0.203) 
(0.169) 
-0.224 
(0.195) 
(0.173) 
-0.198 
(0.251) 
(0.172) 
-0.238 
(0.170) 
(0.174) 
RETAIL 
0.011 
(0.945) 
(0.161) 
0.001 
(0.994) 
(0.161) 
0.025 
(0.879) 
(0.162) 
-0.074 
(0.651) 
(0.163) 
-0.146 
(0.379) 
(0.166) 
-0.152 
(0.361) 
(0.166) 
-0.177 
(0.292) 
(0.168) 
-0.142 
(0.394) 
(0.167) 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 
-0.012 
(0.938) 
(0.160) 
0.037 
(0.814) 
(0.159) 
0.056 
(0.737) 
(0.168) 
0.128 
(0.447) 
(0.169) 
0.228 
(0.193) 
(0.175) 
0.195 
(0.267) 
(0.176) 
0.249 
(0.162) 
(0.178) 
0.245 
(0.164) 
(0.176) 
CONSUMER ELECTRONICS 
0.053 
(0.743) 
(0.160) 
0.065 
(0.686) 
(0.160) 
0.029 
(0.861) 
(0.167) 
0.004 
(0.982) 
(0.167) 
0.044 
(0.796) 
(0.170) 
0.053 
(0.803) 
(0.170) 
0.057 
(0.737) 
(0.171) 
0.038 
(0.823) 
(0.171) 
N 849 848 814 814 749 749 749 749 
-2 Log Likelihood 5458.7 5450.6 5292.4 5274.3 5039.0 5030.2 5024.6 5036.2 
Chi-Square 
33.392 
(0.000) 
38.940 
(0.000) 
55.227 
(0.000) 
74.670 
(0.000) 
81.764 
(0.000) 
84.912 
(0.000) 
100.536 
(0.000) 
82.599 
(0.000) 
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Table V: COX proportional hazard of re-entry within 10 years 
 
aThese variables correspond to EXPERIENCE_DEPTH.  
bThese variables correspond to EXPERIENCE_NATURE.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
 
(sig.) 
S.E. 
                 
EXPERIENCE_LENGTH   
-0.008 
(0.003) 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.116) 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.085) 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.055) 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.100) 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.123) 
(0.003) 
EXPORTS vs. JVa     
-0.351 
(0.002) 
(0.113) 
0.237 
(0.043) 
(0.117) 
-0.240 
(0.044) 
(0.120) 
0.243 
(0.042) 
(0.120) 
-0.250 
(0.038) 
(0.121) 
0.219 
(0.075) 
(0.123) 
NONEQ_ALLIANCES vs. JVa     
-0.445 
(0.001) 
(0.137) 
0.422 
(0.003) 
(0.141) 
-0.505 
(0.001) 
(0.146) 
0.499 
(0.001) 
(0.146) 
-0.417 
(0.004) 
(0.146) 
0.471 
(0.001) 
(0.147) 
WOS vs. JVa     
-0.607 
(0.000) 
(0.125) 
0.438 
(0.001) 
(0.131) 
-0.362 
(0.006) 
(0.131) 
0.378 
(0.004) 
(0.132) 
-0.379 
(0.004) 
(0.132) 
0.343 
(0.010) 
(0.133) 
POORMKT_PERFORMANCEb       
0.639 
(0.000) 
(0.126) 
0.304 
(0.000) 
(0.044) 
0.137 
(0.202) 
(0.107) 
0.177 
(0.094) 
(0.106) 
0.162 
(0.127) 
(0.106) 
POORMODE_PERFORMANCEb       
0.428 
(0.000) 
(0.103) 
0.147 
(0.001) 
(0.043) 
-0.416 
(0.001) 
(0.126) 
0.457 
(0.000) 
(0.126) 
0.429 
(0.001) 
(0.128) 
INST_QUAL (1)         
0.289 
(0.000) 
(0.046) 
0.272 
(0.000) 
(0.059) 
-0.501 
(0.059) 
(0.266) 
0.130 
(0.363) 
(0.143) 
INST_QUAL (2)         
0.142 
(0.001) 
(0.043) 
0.040 
(0.493) 
(0.058) 
0.060 
(0.807) 
(0.246) 
0.001 
(0.994) 
(0.138) 
INST_QUAL (1) x 
EXPERIENCE_LENGTH 
          
0.001 
(0.807) 
(0.002)     
INST_QUAL (2) x 
EXPERIENCE_LENGTH 
          
0.007 
(0.013) 
(0.003)     
INST_QUAL (1) x EXPORTS vs. 
JVa 
 
 
           
-0.296 
(0.024) 
(0.132)   
INST_QUAL (1) x 
NONEQ_ALLIANCES vs. JVa 
 
 
           
-0.550 
(0.000) 
(0.150)   
INST_QUAL (1) x WOS vs. JVa             
-0.211 
(0.114) 
(0.134)   
INST_QUAL (2) x EXPORTS vs. 
JVa 
            
-0.029 
(0.815) 
(0.124)   
INST_QUAL (2) x 
NONEQ_ALLIANCES vs. JVa 
            
-0.114 
(0.382) 
(0.131)   
INST_QUAL (2) x WOS vs. JVa             
0.027 
(0.838) 
(0.134)   
INST_QUAL (1) x 
POORMKT_PERFORMANCEb 
              
-0.134 
(0.171) 
(0.098) 
INST_QUAL (1) x 
POORMODE_PERFORMANCEb 
              
-0.103 
(0.415) 
(0.126) 
INST_QUAL (2) x 
POORMKT_PERFORMANCEb 
              
-0.164 
(0.113) 
(0.103) 
INST_QUAL (2) x 
POORMODE_PERFORMANCEb 
              
-0.077 
(0.541) 
(0.126) 
Controls                  
LNSIZE 
-0.120 
(0.000) 
(0.033) 
-0.119 
(0.000) 
(0.033) 
-0.109 
(0.001) 
(0.034) 
-0.105 
(0.002) 
(0.034) 
-0.094 
(0.007) 
(0.035) 
-0.099 
(0.005) 
(0.035) 
-0.084 
(0.018) 
(0.036) 
-0.092 
(0.009) 
0.035 
AGE 
0.002 
(0.083) 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.049) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.201) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.131) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.155) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.212) 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.146) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.178) 
(0.001) 
NCOUNTRY_INT 
0.001 
(0.301) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.441) 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.442) 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.137) 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.056) 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.054) 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.067) 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.054) 
(0.001) 
NCOUNTRY_HOST 
-0.011 
(0.070) 
(0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.061) 
(0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.064) 
(0.006) 
-0.013 
(0.048) 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.348) 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.333) 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.304) 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.412) 
(0.006) 
NYEARS 
-0.119 
(0.033) 
(0.056) 
-0.046 
(0.444) 
(0.060) 
-0.022 
(0.717) 
(0.061) 
-0.052 
(0.393) 
(0.061) 
-0.006 
(0.918) 
(0.062) 
0.001 
(0.983) 
(0.062) 
-0.010 
(0.874) 
(0.063) 
-0.006 
(0.926) 
(0.062) 
REG 
0.076 
(0.392) 
(0.089) 
0.068 
(0.448) 
(0.089) 
0.061 
(0.498) 
(0.091) 
0.071 
(0.434) 
(0.091) 
0.115 
(0.216) 
(0.093) 
0.132 
(0.160) 
(0.094) 
0.084 
(0.368) 
(0.094) 
0.100 
(0.290) 
(0.094) 
PRIOR_PRESENCE 
0.236 
(0.018) 
(0.100) 
0.236 
(0.018) 
(0.099) 
0.200 
(0.048) 
(0.101) 
0.120 
(0.244) 
(0.103) 
-0.073 
(0.495) 
(0.106) 
-0.076 
(0.474) 
(0.107) 
-0.093 
(0.391) 
(0.108) 
-0.082 
(0.444) 
(0.107) 
AUTOMOTIVE 
-0.141 
(0.261) 
(0.126) 
-0.120 
(0.342) 
(0.127) 
-0.239 
(0.071) 
(0.132) 
-0.334 
(0.013) 
(0.134) 
-0.344 
(0.013) 
(0.137) 
-0.343 
(0.014) 
(0.139) 
-0.339 
(0.014) 
(0.139) 
-0.354 
(0.011) 
(0.140) 
RETAIL 
-0.050 
(0.713) 
(0.137) 
-0.056 
(0.682) 
(0.137) 
-0.012 
(0.933) 
(0.143) 
-0.098 
(0.483) 
(0.139) 
-0.179 
(0.208) 
(0.142) 
-0.184 
(0.194) 
(0.142) 
-0.195 
(0.175) 
(0.143) 
-0.172 
(0.226) 
(0.142) 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 
-0.061 
(0.648) 
(0.134) 
0.001 
(0.994) 
(0.134) 
-0.017 
(0.903) 
(0.143) 
0.068 
(0.639) 
(0.144) 
0.200 
(0.177) 
(0.147) 
0.185 
(0.213) 
(0.149) 
0.185 
(0.216) 
(0.150) 
0.217 
(0.145) 
(0.149) 
CONSUMER ELECTRONICS 
0.246 
(0.051) 
(0.126) 
0.253 
(0.044) 
(0.125) 
0.227 
(0.084) 
(0.131) 
0.204 
(0.120) 
(0.131) 
0.243 
(0.071) 
(0.134) 
0.238 
(0.078) 
(0.135) 
0.262 
(0.053) 
(0.135) 
0.252 
(0.064) 
(0.136) 
N 849 848 814 814 749 749 749 749 
-2 Log Likelihood 7903.7 7893.1 7543.6 7514.4 7125.6 7118.9 7110.1 7121.1 
Chi-Square 
47.491 
(0.000) 
54.576 
(0.000) 
74.192 
(0.000) 
104.454 
(0.000) 
114.617 
(0.000) 
116.284 
(0.000) 
133.303 
(0.000) 
116.753 
(0.000) 
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Figure II. Interaction effect between depth of experience and host institutional ambiguity 
N.B.: Low (high) depth of experience and low (high) host institutional ambiguity correspond to values below (above) the mean minus (plus) 
half of a standard deviation.  
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Speed of re-entry 
Depth of experience 
